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The Importance of Being English: National Identity and Nationalism in Post-
Devolution England  
Ross Bond, Charlie Jeffery, Michael Rosie 
 
This themed section of Nations and Nationalism emerges from the Institute of 
Governance’s seminar series, ‘Identity and Governance in England’, funded by the 
James Madison Trust. The Institute is a focal point for research on the politics and 
sociology of sub-state nations and regions and the series thus reflected two key areas 
of interest: ‘territorial’ identities (both ‘national’ and ‘regional’) and the means by 
which such territories are governed. This is of particular relevance in a contemporary 
European context where decentralised government is increasingly the norm. The 
focus on England derives from its seemingly anomalous status with respect to these 
issues. While other parts of the UK are now represented by their own devolved 
parliament and assemblies, England (with the partial exception of London) continues 
to lack any elected political institution a national or regional level. Further, while 
political developments in other parts of the UK are often assumed to be strongly 
related to distinctive territorial identities, recent scholarship has identified 
ambivalences and ambiguities characterising English identities. The position of 
England and of Englishness appears all the more interesting since 2007 from when 
devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland included parties 
committed to the dissolution of the UK. The widely expected election of a 
Conservative UK government - with that party’s strongly English core support, 
tradition of strong commitment to the Union and greater scepticism towards 
devolution - promises to be a further significant development.  
From the latest empirical evidence and scholarly thought presented by the series, this 
themed issue brings together key contributions to our understanding of English 
identity and English nationalism1. It is notable, although not altogether surprising, 
that the series was devised and hosted in Scotland. People in Scotland are more 
familiar with, indeed accustomed to, viewing political and social matters through 
plural (Scottish and/or British) national lenses and are sometimes curious that a 
similar perspective does not seem to hold in England. However, as the following 
contributions make clear, it would be unwise to conclude that questions of national 
identity have little resonance in England. Overall, our contributors address (implicitly 
or explicitly) a number of ‘English questions’ to different degrees and in different 
ways.  
 
Where stands England? 
The contemporary status of England and Englishness must be understood not only 
through comparison with other parts of the UK but equally importantly through 
relation to the broader - and to some degree overlapping - question of Britishness. 
Wider supranational and global developments such as post-imperialism and the 
growth of the European Union is also significant. Krishan Kumar’s contribution notes 
the oft-paraphrased clue from Conan Doyle’s Silver Blaze: “English nationalism is the 
dog that did not bark” (Kumar, 2009: pX).  Kumar notes the limitations of 
comparison in these islands, arguing that “England and the English have played too 
distinctive and peculiar a role in the United Kingdom for easy analogies with other 
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nationalisms, politically pleasing as [these] might be” (2009:X). Here any ‘crisis of 
identity’ being faced in England has to be understood in terms of the historic 
entanglements – confusion even – of Englishness and Britishness. Strikingly, we find 
ourselves in a historic moment when the English (“whatever their past 
misdemeanours”) have a clear conception about the distinction between both England 
and Britain, Britishness and Englishness. For Kumar this might well presage ‘the 
death of England’ – or at least the England ‘of old’ – and its re-invention and re-
definition. His essay marks a useful and constructive starting point on just such a 
journey.  
Ben Wellings is less confident that the English now recognise the distinctions 
between England and Britain. He focuses on one potential vehicle for English 
nationalism, though, paradoxically, a potential distraction from it: Euroscepticism. 
Wellings argues that “Euroscepticism is in all but name English nationalism”, albeit 
an English nationalism that “speaks the language of Britishness”. Indeed 
Euroscepticism’s popular appeal, he implies, lies in the continued invoking of an 
Anglo-British version (and conflation) of England and Britain. Here the keystone to 
English nationalism is the valorisation of ‘Parliamentary sovereignty’ and a 
concomitant historical narrative which stresses the great victories of Britain/England. 
Such a narrative is not merely the stuff of Euroscepticism – note, for example, the 
implications of Peter Keller’s recent Democracy: 1,000 Years in Pursuit of British 
Liberty (Mainstream, 2009). For Eurosceptics, though, running along the Anglo-
British narrative is a strong sense that where Britons once triumphed through the 
sacrifices of war, indeed ruled the waves, they have contrived to have lost the peace. 
Here Wellings focuses on ‘anxieties’, in particular over the loss of Britain’s 
‘greatness’, and a continuing European threat to Parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Arthur Aughey’s paper also focuses on such contemporary English ‘anxieties’. While 
the ‘anxiety of absence’ relates in part to  the perceived erosion of the essence of 
Englishness as a result of the wider social processes of globalisation and 
consumerisation, two other anxieties concern how England relates to the other parts of 
the post-devolution UK. The ‘anxiety of anticipation’ reflects a fear that England is 
ill-prepared for any post-UK future to which its neighbours will more readily 
accommodate. This negative self-comparison with the other UK nations extends to 
the final anxiety, the ‘anxiety of imitation’: rather than England being the agenda-
setting core of the UK state, it must now ape the peripheral nations in finding a more 
assertive national confidence. In contrast, Susan Condor’s paper finds less evidence of 
such anxieties suggests that the response (by ‘ordinary’ people in England) to 
nationalism and political developments such as devolution is more phlegmatic and 
considered than the statements of those who would speak for them often suggest. This 
contrast between popular and elite discourse is an issue of fundamental importance 
and one we will return to in our final question. First though, we consider evidence on 
the contemporary expression of English identity. 
 
Expressions of English national identity 
This question of English identity, and its expression, is addressed in quite different 
ways by Curtice, Condor and Aughey. John Curtice’s focus, by way of contrast to 
much of the chatter from political and cultural commentators, is on English opinion 
measured rather than simply invoked. Curtice asks whether the experience of the 
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devolution settlement has moved England any closer to being in possession of a 
recognisably English nationalism. One important element here concerns whether the 
asymmetry of governance in the UK has left people in England sufficiently aggrieved 
so as to develop a distinctive (and distinctively English) sense of identity. His careful 
study of survey data from the British Social Attitudes series reveals “a little evidence” 
of an increased identification with Englishness, though he is cautious as to the extent 
to which this can be emphasised or, indeed, mobilised upon. Drawing on a quite 
different body of evidence – an impressive corpus of interview data amassed over the 
course of a decade – Condor’s contribution partly addresses the perception that the 
English suffer from a failure to recognize their own national identities. She identifies 
four broad perspectives, only one of which (‘Popular Nationalism’) represents an 
explicitly English Nationalist (in a political sense) view. The other perspectives – 
‘Localism’, ‘Reasonable Pragmatism’, and ‘Liberal Cosmopolitanism’ – respectively 
represent more disengaged, suspicious, and openly oppositional stances toward the 
strong assertion of national identities and political Nationalism. However, Condor’s 
overall argument suggests that this should not lead us to conclude that the English are 
suffering from collective national identity confusion or amnesia. Aughey considers 
English nationalism in terms of anxiety and injustice, and as both ‘mood’ and 
‘movement’. The ‘mood’ is outlined through four related political and cultural 
anxieties, one of which, the ‘anxiety of absence’ relates to an English lack of 
reflection on matters of national identity. The potential for anxieties such as these to 
be mobilised via political movement is central to the next two questions. 
 
Is there a demand for devolved government in England, and why (not)?  
Curtice’s and Condor’s quantitative and qualitative approaches offer us the ideal basis 
on which to answer each part of this question. Shortly after devolution in Scotland 
and Wales Curtice, alongside Anthony Heath, posed the question ‘Is the English Lion 
About to Roar?’ (Curtice & Heath, 2000). They came to the conclusion that claims 
over an ‘English backlash’ were inflated. In his contribution here, Curtice asks 
whether the experience of the devolution settlement has moved England any closer to 
seeking institutional recognition of its national distinctiveness. The survey data he 
examines offers some evidence that resentment and grievance over the present 
constitutional arrangements are growing. However Curtice concludes that this does 
not translate into support for change, in terms of either an English Parliament or for 
regional assemblies across England. In 2007 - just as in 2000 - a majority of 
respondents in England believed that the best manner in which England could be 
governed was “as it is now, with laws made by the UK parliament”. Such a careful 
perspective is of central importance given that many commentators continue to warn 
that an ‘English backlash’ is looming, and that some particular aspects of the politics 
of anxiety and grievance have become more palpable.  
Condor’s paper also emerges from a concern with perennial siren calls over such a 
‘backlash’ despite its continued and ‘enigmatic’ absence. She begins by identifying 
two contradictory views which underlay predictions of English grievance: that the 
devolution legislation denied the English the political expression of their national 
identity; and that it would encourage the politicization of this identity. One of the 
most commonly proposed sources of this absence of English discontent considered by 
Condor is the alleged English failure to recognize their own national identities and 
interests, which we discussed above; a second commonly cited reason is that the 
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English are apathetic. Condor concludes that neither of these offers a satisfactory 
explanation. The four broad perspectives on devolution and national identity which 
she outlines (and which we discussed above) are distinct in many respects, but what 
they share is a disinclination to see devolution to the other UK nations as inherently 
problematic and the lack of an unequivocal desire for distinctively English 
representation. She argues that the absence of an English backlash is due to neither 
apathy nor the absence of Englishness but relates to the different ways in which 
people in England understand their national status and their tendency to view 
devolution as a matter of justice rather than of national interests.  
While Curtice’s and Condor’s contributions illuminate and explain the (lack of) 
popular appetite for constitutional change in England, Aughey considers two potential 
vehicles for heightening and mobilising English nationalism and its political 
expression through elected institutions. The Campaign for an English Parliament 
(CEP) is the most obviously radical of these with its eponymous objective fairly 
straightforward (although there is some equivocation as to whether the final outcome 
ought to be a devolved or fully independent England). The key obstacle to the success 
of the CEP is the level of popular support for its aims, which Curtice’s analysis 
suggests is modest at best. The Conservative Party, a more established and moderate 
vehicle, may seem to have much to gain from adopting a more strident English 
nationalism. However, Conservatism is a prisoner of its unionist history and 
principles and, as Aughey shows, its proposed answers to constitutional asymmetry 
have, if anything, become more cautious in recent years. Ultimately then, the 
continued absence of a powerful political vehicle with an obvious appetite for English 
nationalism – and, as shown by Curtice, a muted desire for such a movement amongst 
broader English opinion – would seem to present a fundamental obstacle to any 
radical constitutional change involving England. 
 
The contrast between elite and popular perspectives  
Arguably, this contrast between popular perspectives and the views of some elite 
nationalist figures is fundamental to the limited nature of any English ‘backlash’. It is 
here that we might find an answer to the English ‘enigma’. The comparison and 
relationship between elite and popular perspectives is of course an issue familiar to 
scholars of nations and nationalism. (Democratic) governance may be something 
primarily ‘done’ by elites, but it requires popular legitimation, which in turn derives 
to some extent from the ways in which national and/or state identities are understood. 
In Aughey’s paper, the political and cultural anxieties and sense of injustice which 
constitute the ‘mood’ of English nationalism are largely expressed at an elite level. 
Ironically one of these anxieties – the ‘anxiety of silence’ – suspects suppression of 
debate on the English question by another elite group: an intelligentsia distrustful of 
and inimical to English national pride. Similarly, for Condor the predictive warnings 
of future grievance and conflict based on the suppression (or encouragement) of 
English national identity are sourced largely from the political class. Here the 
continued contemporary warnings of an impending English backlash are attributed 
principally to the media. This is why contributions like those of Curtice and Condor 
are so important, because in different ways they offer the people of England the 
opportunity to speak for themselves, to “… consider what, if anything, The English 
have to say for and about themselves” (Condor, this volume). As we have seen, 
neither Curtice’s survey-based evidence nor Condor’s analysis of interview data 
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suggests that there is a popular mood of English nationalist anxiety and grievance to 
match that often voiced at an elite level.  
 
                                                 
1 Other speakers in the series included Sarah Ayres, Chris Bryant, Michael Keating and Varun Uberoi, 
as well as three speakers from beyond the academy: Wendy Alexander, Henry McLeish and Peter 
Riddell 
